ArticleWith cold winter days a distant memory, Spring brings with it a multitude of decisions from courts throughout the State addressed to issues affecting the field of trusts and estates.
Consider the following:
Award of Legal Fees to Petitioner as Result of Objectants’ Bad Faith
Before the Surrogate’s Court, Ulster County, in In re Langston, was a contested probate proceeding in which the decedent’s four children, who had been omitted from the propounded instrument, filed objections alleging lack of due execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud.
Subsequent to the review of relevant medical records and SCPA 1404 examinations by objectants’ counsel, counsel requested additional time to depose the nominated executors under the will, explaining that he was doing so at the insistence of his clients. The record reflected that objectants’ counsel was made aware that the decedent had executed a prior will which had also disinherited his clients. In addition, at a conference of the matter, objectants’ counsel acknowledged that his clients did not have any valid objections to probate, though he did state that the decedent’s former spouse had objections. Nevertheless, in lieu of objections, the former spouse filed a notice of election against the estate.
Following the completion of discovery, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the objections and probate. Additionally, citing objectants’ bad faith, petitioners also sought to impose costs for attorneys’ fees. The motion was unopposed.
Upon consideration, the court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and admitted the decedent’s will to probate. As to petitioners’ request for counsel fees, the court opined that imposing petitioners’ counsel fees on an objectant should only be employed when the facts clearly demonstrate the contest was not conducted in good faith, and that no basis existed for attacking the propounded instrument. In view of the record, the court found that the objectants conducted themselves in bad faith. Despite having no demonstrable facts to support their position, objectants insisted on deposing the petitioners even though they were not involved in the preparation of the will, or had any information as to the decedent’s capacity or undue influence.
Moreover, after completing discovery, the court concluded that the objectants had no good faith basis for pursuing their claims, and should have withdrawn their objections rather than causing petitioners to file a motion for summary judgment. In view thereof, the court found that the objectants pursued meritless litigation long after they knew, or should have known, that they lacked reasonable grounds to proceed, and consequently, acted frivolously and in bad faith. Petitioners’ request for legal fees was, therefore, granted.
In re Langston, 2026 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1419 (Sur. Ct. Ulster County 2026).
Objections to Issuance of Letters of Trusteeship Dismissed
Before the Surrogate’s Court, Putnam County, in In re Southlea, was a proceeding pursuant to SCPA 1502 for successor letters of trusteeship with respect to a testamentary trust created for the benefit of the petitioner and his brother under their deceased mother’s will. The principal asset of the trust was the decedent’s stock holdings in a real estate business involved in the ownership, operation and management of an apartment building in Westchester.
The decedent’s spouse was originally named as trustee of the trust. The trust failed to name a successor. Accordingly, following the decedent’s death, petitioner sought his appointment as successor, which was opposed by his brother (“respondent”), who appeared pro se. More specifically, respondent filed a combined set of objections, consisting of an unnumbered, undated two -page document, a cross-petition, and a motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved to dismiss these objections, contending that respondent’s filing was improper. Respondent did not oppose the motion, but instead, filed amended objections to the proceeding that were virtually identical to his initial filing, together with a motion to dismiss. Petitioner opposed the motion and sought to dismiss the objections, as well as requested summary judgment granting him successor letters. In support of his motion to dismiss, petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent’s papers were improperly served, poorly drafted, and hinged on unsupported general claims.
The Court found that respondent’s initial filing was procedurally deficient, and declined to treat it as a motion to dismiss. Moreover, it concluded that respondent’s purported cross-petition was not properly filed, inasmuch as he failed to pay the required filing fee, and the alleged petition failed to comply with the statutory requirement that every pleading consist of plain and concise statements in consecutively numbered paragraphs, and that each paragraph contain, as far as practicable, a single allegation. Further, the Court found that respondent did not file a proper cross-motion on notice as defined in the CPLR, and, additionally, improperly served the motion on the petitioner, rather than his attorney as required by CPLR 2103.
Based on the foregoing, the Court held that respondent’s purported cross-motion and amended objections were defective for failure to comply with the statutory requirements of the CPLR and the Uniform Rules. In pertinent part, the Court noted that the amended objections were not properly verified or affirmed, and failed to conform with the required specificity required of pleadings. As such, the Court declined to find the objections properly filed, and to treat respondent’s filing as opposition to petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Concluding thereby that petitioner’s motion was unopposed, the Court dismissed respondent’s objections finding that they were devoid of merit, and based on overbroad, rambling, and conclusory allegations.
With respect to petitioner’s request for his appointment as successor trustee, the Court found that pursuant to the provisions of the decedent’s will, the testamentary trust at issue terminated on the death of the original trustee. That said, given the failure of the decedent to nominate a successor, the Court held that the appointment of a trustee was required to administer and distribute the balance of the trust estate to its beneficiaries. Notwithstanding the hostility between the petitioner and the respondent, the Court found the petitioner to be eligible and competent to fulfill the role in a fair and equitable manner. Accordingly, the Court granted the petitioner’s application.
In re Southlea, 2026 NYLJ LEXIS 513 (Sur. Ct. Putnam County 2026).
Appellate Court Finds Issue of Fact on Claim of Undue Influence
Before the Appellate Division, Third Department, in In re Baird, was an appeal from so much of an order and decree of the Surrogate’s Court, Orange County, as granted those branches of the respondents’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate, and the amended petition seeking to invalidate the decedent’s revocable trust. Upon due consideration, the Court reversed the decree granting probate, and modified the order entered with respect to the revocable trust, finding that a question of fact existed in both the probate and trust proceedings on the issue of undue influence.
The decedent died at the age of 101 survived by three sons and one daughter, who had a child of her own. In June, 2019, the decedent executed a will, which named his four children as residuary beneficiaries and co-executors of his estate. In October, 2019, the decedent executed the propounded instrument, which, in pertinent part, bequeathed a stated sum to his daughter, named only his sons as residuary beneficiaries and co-executors of his estate, and contained an in terrorem clause. Shortly thereafter, the decedent executed the subject revocable trust agreement, which provided for the same stated sum to be distributed to his daughter, either by will or trust, for his sons to share equally in the remainder, and for two of his sons to serve as trustees.
Following the decedent’s death, his sons offered his last will for probate, and objections were filed by the decedent’s daughter and granddaughter on the grounds, inter alia, of undue influence. The daughter and granddaughter also filed a separate proceeding to invalidate the trust agreement alleging that the decedent lacked contractual capacity, and that the trust agreement was the product of undue influence. The decedent’s sons moved for summary judgment dismissing the objections to probate based on lack of due execution, lack of capacity and undue influence, and separately moved for summary judgment dismissing so much of the amended petition to invalidate the trust agreement as alleged that the decedent lacked contractual capacity and was the result of undue influence. The decedent’s daughter and granddaughter moved for summary judgment declaring any transfers to the trust void.
The Surrogate’s Court granted the sons’ motion, denied the motion of the daughter and granddaughter, and admitted the decedent’s will to probate. The daughter and granddaughter (“appellants”) appealed.
The Court found that the decedent’s sons (“respondents”) had demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the objection to probate based on lack of due execution by submitting the deposition transcript of the attorney who drafted and supervised the execution of the will, which included an attestation clause and a self-proving affidavit. Equally so, the Court found that the sons had established, prima facie, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed by submitting the self-proving affidavit of the attesting witnesses and the deposition transcripts of those witnesses. The Court held that the appellants had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to either one of these issues.
However, the Court concluded that while the respondents had demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the appellants had raised triable issues of fact as to whether one of the respondents had a confidential relationship with the decedent, and whether the execution of the propounded will was the product of his undue influence. To this extent, the Court noted that the appellants presented evidence that the son controlled the decedent’s communications, finances, and care, which raised an issue of fact as to whether the decedent depended on him for the management of his affairs. They also presented evidence that although the decedent had invited his granddaughter to his home, she was denied entry when she arrived, and the decedent’s home telephone number had been disconnected shortly thereafter. Moreover, the will constituted an unexplained departure from the decedent’s prior testamentary plan.
In light of the foregoing, the Court found that summary judgment should not have been granted in respondents’ favor on the issue of undue influence in the procurement of the propounded will. For the same reasons, the Court found that summary judgment should have been denied on the issue of undue influence in connection with the trust agreement. However, as to the issue of capacity, the Court found that the Surrogate’s Court erred in applying the testamentary capacity standard. To that extent, the Court held that the respondents had established, prima facie, that the decedent possessed contractual capacity at the time the trust agreement was executed, and that, in opposition, the appellants had failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
In re Baird, 2026 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1611 (2d Dep’t 2026).
Ilene Sherwyn Cooper is a partner with Farrell Fritz, P.C., practicing in the area of Estate Litigation. She can be reached at icooper@farrellfritz.com.
Reprinted with permission from the May 8, 2026 edition of The New York Law Journal © 2025 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-257-3382 or reprints@alm.com.
