Court of Appeals Reaffirms SEQRA Standing for Affected Property Owners

New York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) plays a key role in its municipalities’ decision-making. Designed to ensure that environmental considerations are meaningfully incorporated into governmental actions, SEQRA requires state and local governmental agencies, including municipalities, to assess the potential environmental impacts of (i.e., take the required “hard look” at ) proposed activities before taking any action.

As a threshold matter, standing to challenge governmental action under SEQRA has long been a point of contention. While SEQRA reflects the New York State Legislature’s commitment to environmental conservation, not every party opposed to a governmental action may challenge an agency determination in court. Standing to sue under SEQRA requires that the petitioner establish an“ injury-in-fact” that falls within the “zone of interest” that the statute protects. This is accomplished by demonstrating that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature.

Over time, New York courts have refined this doctrine, such that affected property owners whose property is “the very subject” of the government action need not specify allegations of environmental harm, thus distinguishing between different categories of challengers and their standing requirements.

In In the Matter of Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls, et al., 2025 NY Slip Op 06961, the New York Court of Appeals recently revisited these standing principles in the context of a local law enacted by Seneca Falls prohibiting solid waste disposal facilities from operating within its borders. The court held that when a property owner challenges SEQRA compliance in connection with a governmental action targeting their land, a court’s analysis of their standing to lodge that challenge differs from the one applicable to neighboring or nearby landowners.

In doing so, the court reaffirmed established precedent while underscoring the continued importance of SEQRA’s “hard look” requirement.

A SEQRA Primer

SEQRA is codified in Article 8 of New York’s Environmental Conservation Law and is intended, per the statute’s own language, to “promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and enhance human and community resources” by making environmental considerations a requirement in certain governmental decision-making.

Rather than prescribing substantive outcomes, SEQRA imposes procedural and statutory obligations on state and local agencies to ensure that environmental factors are considered alongside social and economic concerns before deciding to approve an action.

At the heart of SEQRA compliance is the requisite “hard look” to evaluate the consequences of a proposed action. Under the implementing regulations, including 6 NYCRR § 617.7, the lead agency in contemplating the significance of a Type 1 or Unlisted action must: thoroughly analyze the identified relevant areas of environmental concern to determine if the action may have a significant adverse impact on the environment, and set forth its determination of significance in a written form containing a
reasoned elaboration and providing reference to any supporting documentation. A review of a potential action without such analysis will not withstand judicial scrutiny.

SEQRA Standing in Practice

As with other statutory causes of action, standing to sue under SEQRA requires a petitioner to establish an injury-in-fact that falls within the zone of interests the statute is designed to protect. Ordinarily, this means showing that the challenged governmental action will cause an environmental injury distinct from purely economic harm.
Courts have repeatedly emphasized that most plaintiffs must allege more than generalized grievances or financial impacts to secure standing under SEQRA. Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772, 1991).

Over time, the Court of Appeals has recognized an important qualification to that general rule. In Har Enters. v. Town of Brookhaven, 74 N.Y.2d 524 (N.Y. 1989), the court addressed a rezoning that targeted a petitioner’s property. It held that in such a circumstance, the property owner need not allege a specific “environmental harm” to challenge the sufficiency of the agency’s SEQRA review.

The court’s reasoning in Har results in the obvious. A property owner’s interest in their project could be “so substantial and its connection to it so direct or intimate as to give it standing without the necessity of demonstrating the likelihood of resultant environmental harm.” Even if the owner could not show an adverse environmental effect at the time they brought suit, they “nevertheless have a legally cognizable interest in being assured that the decision makers, before proceeding, have considered all of
the potential environmental consequences, taken the required ‘hard look,’ and made the necessary ‘reasoned elaboration’ of the basis for their determination.”

The Court of Appeals reaffirmed and expanded upon that principle in Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 87 N.Y.2d 668 (N.Y. 1996), where a zoning amendment eliminated a landowner’s ability to conduct mining operations on its property. Once again, the court concluded that an affected property owner had standing to assert a SEQRA challenge based solely on their status as the owner of property directly regulated by a governmental action. In such circumstances, the owner’s interest in meaningful SEQRA compliance suffices to satisfy the statute’s zone-of-interests requirement, even without allegations of environmental harm distinct from the regulation itself.

Lower courts have applied these principles when evaluating SEQRA standing, particularly where legislative actions such as zoning amendments or local laws restrict the use of identified parcels. Courts have distinguished challenges brought by property owners from challenges brought by nearby or neighboring property owners, who must show a concrete environmental injury different in kind or degree from that suffered by the public at large.

Courts may infer potential aggrievement from these owners’ proximity to the affected property, but proximity alone is not sufficient. Such challengers must show their alleged injury is environmental and falls within SEQRA’s zone of interests, rather than reflecting generalized community opposition or economic concerns.

‘Matter of Seneca Meadows’

In 2016, following years of residents’ complaints about odors from Seneca Meadow Inc.’s (SMI) solid waste disposal facility—the only one that operated within the Town of Seneca Falls—the Town of Seneca Falls Town Board passed a local law that prohibited solid waste disposal facilities from operating in the town, but existing licensed facilities could continue operating until the earlier of their permit expiring or December 31, 2025.

SMI challenged the law on several grounds in the Seneca County Supreme Court, including that the Town Board violated SEQRA requirements by failing to take the required hard look at relevant areas of environmental concern. SMI moved for partial summary judgment on its SEQRA cause of action to declare the new law invalid.

The defendants-respondents, including the Town of Seneca Falls, opposed the motion on the grounds that SMI lacked standing to assert its SEQRA cause of action. The Seneca County Supreme Court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, holding that SMI had standing and that the Town Board failed to take the required hard look at the potential environmental impacts the landfill closure would cause when it determined the new law would have no significant adverse environmental impacts.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment. In a 3-2 decision, the majority held SMI lacked standing because it failed to establish that “it had suffered or would suffer an environmental injury” even though it had alleged it would suffer economic injuries.

Two judges dissented, writing that they would have affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment based on Har and Gernatt, that SMI did not have to allege an environmental injury to have standing to assert a SEQRA claim because it owned property affected by the new law, and that the Town Board failed to take the required “hard look.”

In a decision issued this past December, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that a property owner is required under SEQRA to allege a separate environmental injury.

Relying on its prior decisions in Har and Gernatt, the court held SMI had standing as the owner of property directly regulated by the new law. As the court explained, a property owner whose land is the subject of the challenged governmental action has a legally cognizable interest in ensuring that a government agency satisfies SEQRA before proceeding with an action.

The court emphasized that an affected property owner’s standing does not turn on whether the owner can identify a particular environmental harm resulting from the action. Rather, the owner’s interest lies in ensuring that the agency engaged in the procedural safeguards SEQRA requires, including taking a hard look at potential environmental impacts and providing a “reasoned elaboration” for its determination.

Clarifying Standing

The Court of Appeals’ decision in Seneca Meadows reinforces the principle that standing to challenge SEQRA compliance is not uniform for all challengers. Courts will assess affected property owners’ standing to bring SEQRA claims differently from how they assess neighboring owners or other groups. For the former, ownership of the regulated property, even a class of one, itself will often establish standing. For the latter, they must show a concrete environmental injury within SEQRA’s zone of interests. Economic harm or generalized opposition to a governmental action, without more, will not confer standing.

John C. Armentano is a partner with Farrell Fritz in the firm’s Hauppauge, Long Island office. He practices in the areas of land use, zoning, and municipal law. He can be reached at jcarmentano@farrellfritz.com.