Potential Creditor of Trust Beneficiary Not Interested Party In Accounting Proceeding
March 30, 2012
Determining the identity of permissible or necessary parties to an accounting proceeding is often a simple task. But in rare cases, the answer is not always so easy. Most recently, in Matter of Cohen, Nassau County Surrogate Edward W. McCarty III was called upon to determine whether a potential creditor of a trust beneficiary was a “person interested” in a trust accounting proceeding. The Court answered the question in the negative.
Michael S. Cohen, died on March 18, 2002. Under the terms of his will (which was admitted to probate), the decedent directed that a trust be created for the benefit of his adopted son, Kevin Cohen (“Cohen”), the decedent’s only child. The will further directed that the trust terminate ten years after the decedent’s death, i.e., March 18, 2012, and that all remaining principal and income be distributed to Cohen (or, if he did not survive the termination of the trust, his minor daughters).
Cohen, formerly an attorney, was convicted in 2010 of 37 counts (including second-degree grand larceny, 11 counts of third-degree grand larceny and 10 counts of third-degree forgery) for stealing more than $300,000 from clients who thought he was assisting them in arranging adoptions; but the children did not actually exist. A criminal restitution order under Criminal Procedure Law § 420.10 was entered against him. The Lawyers Fund for Client Protection (the “Fund”) reimbursed 10 of Cohen’s former clients, all of whom assigned and subrogated their claims against Cohen to the Fund.
In January 2011, the trustee filed an intermediate account with the Surrogate’s Court. The trustee named as an interested party the Nassau County Attorney’s Crime Victims Project, which represented Cohen’s former clients in their claims against him. The County Attorney’s Office represented the interests of the former clients before the Lawyers Fund became involved, and it continued to represent one client who did not seek reimbursement from the Fund.
Both the Fund and the Nassau County Attorney filed objections to the account. The Fund, for its part, maintained that it had an interest in the accounting because of open questions on whether particular estate assets (including an annuity) were part of the trust or owned by Cohen separately.
Wendy H. Sheinberg, Esq., the guardian ad litem for Cohen’s two minor children, moved, inter alia, to amend the petition and account to strike the Nassau County Attorney and the Fund as interested parties, and to dismiss their objections to the account.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the statutory definition of “person interested” specifically excludes creditors. Indeed, SCPA § 103(39) provides that “[a] creditor shall not be deemed a person interested.” The Court then reviewed the cases relied upon by the Fund and the County Attorney, determining them to be distinguishable from the case at bar. Instead, the Court relied upon Matter of Lainez, 79 AD2d 78 (2d Dept 1981), in which the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a creditor of a beneficiary who is still alive is not a proper party to an account in which the beneficiary has an interest.
The Court also rejected the agencies’ argument that affording them “interested person” status “would be a more efficient way for them to uncover information about Cohen’s assets than if they had to use other discovery methods.” However laudable the goal of efficiency, the Court explained, it “does not give rise to a privilege, right, or status which would otherwise be unavailable.”
Accordingly, the Court determined that as mere potential creditors of a living trust beneficiary, the Fund and the Nassau County Attorney were not persons interested in the decedent’s estate or the accounting. It therefore granted to guardian ad litem’s motion.
The Surrogate’s decision does not leave the two agencies without a remedy, however. The Surrogate’s dismissal of the agencies’ objections was explicitly made without prejudice to their commencing a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law §632-a (6) – the so-called “Son of Sam” law – and seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction restraining the payment of trust principal to Cohen upon the termination of the trust. The Surrogate also directed that no payments from the trust be made to Cohen for 30 days upon its termination (presumably to give the agencies the opportunity to make an application under the Son of Sam law).